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6XPPDU\
This paper is a wide-ranging overview of issues related to the economic impacts of 
ICT. It discusses the broad issues of theory and method involved in thinking about a 
new radical technology, such as ICT, in economic change. However this discussion 
is extended in several directions – into a discussion of statistical and measurement 
issues,  into an overview of the empirical dimensions of ICT in economic growth 
both at OECD and European levels, and into a discussion of the nature of ICT as a 
technology. Part of the empirical discussion also relates to the indirect use of ICT 
competence, and here we use Norwegian data to make a more general point about the 
impact of ICT. The basic argument here is that many of the analytical claims for 
regarding ICT as a key driver of economic growth are overstated, and that this has 
important policy implications. 
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&KDSWHU 7KHDQDO\WLFDODQGSROLF\
VLJQLILFDQFHRI,&7
How important are information and communications (ICT) technologies in economic 
growth, and how important are ICT policies in wider policies for innovation and 
economic growth? There are many in economics, business and government who 
argue that economic growth has been and is being driven by the growth and inter-
industry impacts of ICT. This idea is of obvious analytical and policy significance. 
From the analytical point of view, if ICT is a core driver of growth, then we have a 
direct route to understanding differences in the growth rates of firms, regions and 
countries. It simply means that performance differences can be explained either by 
differences in rates of investment in ICT, or by differences in diffusion paths, or 
differences in returns to ICT investment. From the policy perspective, if it is the case 
that ICT is a primary driver of growth and employment creation, then it deserves to 
be at the centre of innovation and industrial policies. The policy conclusion seems 
straightforward – governments should invest in the creation of ICT industries, and in 
the diffusion of ICT products and services.  
 
There are many who argue for such perspectives on growth and policy. For example, 
Fagerberg et al, in a recent study of European growth, argue that: 
… the problems that Europe faces in key areas such as growth, equality and 
employment are all related to its failure to take sufficient advantage of technological 
advances, particularly the ICT revolution…science-based industries, particularly 
those drawing heavily on ICT, have become the main driver of technological change 
and economic growth since the 1980s. (Fagerberg et al, 1999,  235)  
The policy conclusion from this seems very clear: 
…what Europe has to do is to is to take steps to embed new technologies, especially 
ICTs, in society. This should bring together regulation, science and technology 
policy, and employment initiatives. (Fagerberg et al, 1999,  235) 
These arguments and conclusions are rather common. Those cited here are unusual 
only in that they are drawn from a serious work of economic analysis, which seeks to 
identify, analyse and understand Europe’s growth path, on the basis of well-
formulated hypotheses that are tested against good-quality data. There are many far 
less serious expressions of the same views, particularly in policy arguments. In policy 
arenas it is common for politicians, policy-makers  (and the lobbyists who seek to 
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influence them and to profit thereby) to promote ICT as a technology which stands 
alone in its impact and implications.  
 
But how justifiable is the idea that ICT is a key driver of growth, and how valid is the 
claim that it should be at the centre of innovation policy? The objective of this paper 
is to evaluate concept, methods and empirical evidence in assessing the economic 
impacts of innovation in information and communication technologies. The basic 
issue is this: +RZFDQZHFRQFHSWXDOLVHWKHDFWXDODQGSRWHQWLDOLPSDFWVRI,&7DQG
KRZDGHTXDWHDUH WKH HFRQRPLFDQG VWDWLVWLFDOPHWKRGRORJLHV WKDW VHHN WRPHDVXUH
WKRVH LPSDFWV" Part of what follows is a critique of positions that dominate both 
innovation analysis and policy discussion at the present time.  But the intention is to 
move beyond this, towards an analysis of how ICT relates to growth and change. The 
argument here is that ICT is part of a wide process of economic change. But it is only 
a part: it fits into a very wide set of more or less independent technological changes 
and framework changes. It is by no means a ‘core’ driving force of recent economic 
history, and it is unlikely to be so in the future. Both its economic importance and its 
policy role therefore require careful qualification. 
 
These issues remain both under-researched and of considerable public importance. In 
terms of public research policy, ICT remains the largest single field of technological 
and R&D investment in virtually all OECD economies. This will almost certainly 
continue, and so it is extremely important both for public debate and for policy design 
to clarify the economic role of ICT. But understanding the role and impact of new 
sectors and new technologies involves subtle conceptual problems. In the field of 
ICT, too many conclusions have been drawn too soon. It is time to reflect in more 
detail on the conceptual and methodological background: let us turn to this. 
 $QDO\WLFDOTXHVWLRQV
Understanding the economics of ICT involves exploring at least five related 
analytical questions, all of which are more or less unresolved at the present time. 
They are: 
 
• How adequate are the existing approaches to the links between ICT and 
economic growth? How good are they conceptually, and how to they stand up in 
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relation to relevant empirical evidence on growth? What are the theoretical and 
empirical issues involved in assessing the economic significance of the ICT industry, 
the inter-industry impacts of  ICT, rates of return to ICT investment, and the growth 
and productivity impacts of ICT? 
 
• What is ’ICT’? What does it mean to speak of ICT as a technology? In what ways 
can we define ICT as an industry? What is the relationship between the growth of 
ICT as an industry, and the impact of ICT as a generic technology? 
 
• How adequate are existing economic statistical frameworks (such as the NACE 
and ISIC classifications) for understanding the dimensions of ICT? How good are 
recent attempts by OECD, and by national agencies such as Statistics Norway, to 
revise or re-order industrial statistics to take account of ICT? 
 
• What are the issues in understanding problems of causality with respect to ICT? 
Under what circumstances can we speak of ICT ‘driving’ or ‘explaining’ economic 
change? Alternatively, what are the issues in understanding the shaping of ICT itself? 
 
The following pages will address these issues in turn. 
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&KDSWHU ,&7DQGHFRQRPLFJURZWK
Understanding the economics of ICT requires an understanding of how it is that a 
new technology generates economic impacts. In terms of ICT we have had two basic 
types of argument; these will be overviewed and discussed critically in later sections 
of this paper. 
 
Firstly, there is what we shall call the ‘structural change’ argument. This position 
argues that economic growth is driven by the emergence of new sectors embodying 
new technologies. These affect growth in two ways. On the one hand the new sectors 
exhibit higher growth rates of output, employment and productivity, so that they in 
some sense ‘drive’ overall growth in the economy. On the other hand, new sectors 
change the conditions of other sectors in the economy, either by providing a new 
range of inputs that raise productivity, or by generating new production methods that 
can be imitated, or both. There are those who argue that ICT is exactly a sector and 
technology of this type, that its quantitative effects are large, and that its qualitative 
effects are creating a totally new type of economy.1  The OECD, in its discussion of 
the ‘new economy’, suggests that  “The term ‘new economy’ has been used 
extensively in recent years to describe the workings of the US economy and in 
particular the part of its economy that is linked to ICT”, linking ICT to its inter-
industry effects: “Due to more efficient business practices linked to ICT use, the new 
economy may experience a pick-up in trend growth, due to higher multifactor 
productivity growth”.2 
 
Second, there what we shall call the ‘productivity growth argument’.  Here the view 
is that ICT is a new type of capital good, and that increasing investment in ICT by 
businesses ought to raise labour productivity and also – if ICT incorporates real 
technical change – total factor productivity as well. But for most of the past thirty 
years this has not happened, leading to a large and long-standing literature on the so-
                                                 
1 See for example, C. Freeman and C. Perez, ’Structural crisis of adjustment: business cycles and 
investment behaviour’ in G. Dosi et al, Technical Change and Economic Theory (London: Pinter 
1988). They argued that ICT was driving a ’techno-economic paradigm shift’ and leading to a 
completely new growth trajectory and organizational structure for the advanced economies. 
2 OECD: A New Economy? The Changing Role of Innovation and information Technology in 
Growth (OECD, Paris) 2000, p.17 
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called ’productivity paradox’. The acceleration of ICT investment which began in the 
1970s has been associated with falling or stagnant productivity indicators.3 In the past 
two years, the approaches used to explore the productivity paradox have in many 
cases been used to argue that, far from having no effect on growth, ICT has in fact 
been driving US growth over the past five years. This literature is almost entirely 
econometric in character, based on only one form of assessment, namely the 
computation of total factor productivity indicators, accompanied by an attempt to 
explain why the ICT inputs are associated with falling or rising growth rates of total 
factor productivity.  
 ,&7DQG(FRQRPLF*URZWK,WKHVWUXFWXUDOFKDQJHDUJXPHQW
Most economic analyses of growth assume that growth is in some sense related to 
qualitative change – that is, it involves doing new things with new processes, so that 
growth is not just an extension of existing activity, but involves change in the 
character of economic activity. But there are a number of ways in which this insight 
can be interpreted.  For example, in 7KH:HDOWKRI1DWLRQV, Adam Smith that growth 
was associated with a more complex division of labour, so that components of 
existing activities would ‘spin-off’ as separate activities, and would then be subject to 
productivity growth as people specialized in these activities and became more skilful 
at carrying them out. Smith also foresaw that knowledge creation would become a 
separate activity, and that this would impel further productivity growth. In this 
framework, growth would follow from widespread productivity change across almost 
the whole spectrum of activities, with specialization driving the growth outcomes.  
 
A different interpretation of the relation between growth and change is to see it in 
terms of the growth of completely new activities. To some extent, this is the 
perspective of Marx in &DSLWDO, where a great deal of attention is paid to the 
emergence of mechanical technologies and the mechanical engineering industry. 
However this perspective only fully emerged early in the twentieth century, in the 
work of the historian Arnold Toynbee. In writing about the Industrial Revolution, 
Toynbee argued that growth sprang from the development of four key industries – 
                                                 
3 Solow’s famous remark about computers being everywhere except in the productivity statistics was 
made in the mid-1980s. The productivity paradox as a research area was well-established by 1990. 
See, for example, the extensive literature published by OECD: Technology and Productivity. The 
challenge for economic policy (OECD: Paris) 1991. 
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textiles, engineering, coal and shipbuilding. This put the focus on specific new 
industries, an approach that became very influential during the twentieth century. A 
well-known summary of this argument can be found in Kuznets, one of the most 
influential of modern growth theorists: 
‘(A) sustained high rate of growth depends upon a continuous emergence of new 
inventions ands innovations, providing the basis for new industries whose high rates 
of growth compensate for the inevitable slowing down in the rate of invention and 
innovation, and upon the economic effects of both, which retard the rates of growth 
of older industries. A high rate of overall growth in an economy is thus necessarily 
accompanied by considerable shifting in relative importance among industries, as the 
old decline and the new increase in realtive weight in the nation’s output’4 
This kind of approach was originally systematised by Joseph Schumpeter, 
particularly in his %XVLQHVV&\FOHV$WKHRUHWLFDOKLVWRULFDODQGVWDWLVWLFDODQDO\VLV
RIWKHFDSLWDOLVWSURFHVV.5 However the explanations that he offers are not clear-cut. 
On the one hand, Schumpeter assigns innovation a central role in shaping economic 
dynamics, and argues the hypothesis that innovation drives wave phenomena; there 
is a rather brief discussion of the character of such innovation.6  On the other hand, 
there is much discussion of entrepreneurship, investment expenditure, money and 
banking and so on  - the point about innovation here is that it provides the motive 
for a growth process which is investment-led. But the real problems are 
entrepreneurship, finance, demand and so on. From one perspective, Schumpeter 
sees the growth impacts of innovation/investment not in terms of productivity 
enhancement but in terms of aggregate demand: 
‘If innovations are embodied in new plant and equipment, additional consumers’ 
spending will result as quickly as additional producers’ spending. Both together will 
spread from the points in the system on which they first impinge, and create that 
complexion of business situations which we call prosperity.’7 
This is not dissimilar from a straightforward Keynesian account of the business 
cycle. What is genuinely different is the account of the nature of relevant 
innovation, and its effects on historical development. Schumpeter in fact offers no 
theory of the generation of innovation, but he makes three important points which 
he seems to treat as empirically founded: ‘stylised facts’ as it were. They are: 
• ,QQRYDWLRQVDUHFOXVWHUHGWRJHWKHUDQGµDUHQRWHYHQO\GLVWULEXWHGLQWLPH¶
                                                 
4 Kuznets 1959, p.33 
5 J. Schumpeter, Business Cycles. A theoretical, historical and statistical analysis of the capitalist 
process (Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 1989). 
6 Schumpeter, op.cit, pp.75-6. 
7 Schumpeter, op.cit, p.121. 
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• ,QQRYDWLRQVµFRQFHQWUDWHRQFHUWDLQVHFWRUVDQGWKHLUVXUURXQGLQJV¶
• 7KHUH DUH GLVFUHSDQFLHV EHWZHHQ WKH JURZWK RI VHFWRUV µVRPH LQGXVWULHV
PRYHRQRWKHUVVWD\EHKLQG¶ 
Innovations disrupt equilibria and cannot be smoothly absorbed into the system. 
However, ‘those disturbances must be “big” in the sense that they will disrupt the 
existing system and enforce a distinct process of adaptation’.9 What ‘big’ means in 
this context emerges gradually: 
‘Historically, the first Kondratieff covered by our material means the industrial 
revolution, including the protracted process of its absorption. We date it from the 
eighties of the eighteenth century to 1842. The second stretches over what has been 
called the age of steam and steel. It runs its course between 1842 and 1897. And the 
third, the Kondratieff of electricity, chemistry, and motors, we date from 1898 on.’10 
The historical analysis consists of three long chapters covering the period 1786 to 
1929. The first of these chapters begins with serious hesitations about whether the 
term ‘industrial revolution’ is appropriate at all. The discussion is entirely focussed 
on the US, and offers no account at all of innovation as a driving force of the wave; 
rather, there is extensive discussion of agricultural developments and political 
conditions, with technologies being mentioned in an entirely DGKRF way. Although 
Schumpeter remarks that ‘The main feature of industry, in the strict sense, was the 
introduction of power machinery which began to turn the workshop of the craft type 
into the factory’, no evidence or systematic discussion is offered, and he seems 
sharply aware of the limitations of this. In fact he goes so far as to remark that 
‘Technological innovation, let alone “invention” was not in prominence’.11 
 
In turning to the second Kondratiev wave, Schumpeter is on more confident ground, 
stressing railroads: ‘railroadization was obviously the “big thing” or “backbone” of 
the bourgeois Kondratieff’.12 This theme is heavily stressed, but there is an 
accompanying discussion, which concentrates largely on extractive technologies 
(coal, iron ore, petroleum etc.), but also mentions a wide range of techniques 
                                                 
8 Schumpeter, op.cit, pp.75-76. 
9 Schumpeter, op.cit, pp.75. 
10 Schumpeter, op.cit, p.145. It should be noted that Schumpeter is rather vague about the 
periodization: ‘These datings do not lack historical justification. Yet they are not only tentative, but 
also by nature merely approximate. A considerable zone of doubt surrounds most of them…’.  
11 Schumpeter, op.cit, p.192. 
12 Schumpeter, op.cit, p.215; he remarks elsewhere that  ‘For the United States, a history of the 
cyclical process could, in the period of the second Kondratieff, be written almost exclusively in terms 
of railroad development’ (p.231.). 
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developed during the period. In other words, despite the argument that there is a 
‘carrier’ technology which drives growth in each period, Schumpeter in fact 
undercuts the argument by focusing on the pervasiveness of technological change. 
The third Kondratiev wave is also ostensibly oriented to one technology: ‘In the 
same sense in which it is possible to associate the second Kondratiev with railroads, 
and with the same qualifications, the third can be associated with electricity’. 
However, once again, a wide range of technologies is discussed. Moreover in both 
of these chapters there is also extensive discussion of social conditions, war, finance 
and banking, political conditions and so on. Schumpeter’s approach is always 
qualified and eclectic, and it is far from clear how the key technologies actually 
relate to the growth process. In other words, the core claims advanced by the book 
are simply not developed or sustained in the text. In fact, although Schumpeter 
remarks that ‘innovation is the outstanding fact in the economic history of capitalist 
society’, he is cautious about the historical explanatory power of the approach, 
remarking rightly that ‘the fact that innovation would suffice to produce alternating 
prosperities and depression does not establish, of course, that these cycles are 
actually the ones which we historically designate as business cycles’.13 He goes on 
to say that 
‘Our proposition that innovation … is actually the dominant element which accounts 
for those historical and statistical phenomena, is so far only a working hypothesis, 
which will be on trial through this book. Moreover our hypothesis is not yet in a 
shape to serve at all and it remains to be seen how much matter unconnected with its 
present content will have to be added to it.’14 
There is scope for disagreement about the extent to which Schumpeter succeeds in 
confirming this hypothesis. Given that his argument explicitly requires growth to be 
driven by large-scale discontinuities, we can question the extent to which he 
demonstrates that these discontinuities actually exist, and the largely descriptive 
approach he adopts to innovation seems to prevent - despite the title of the book - 
any statistical link to the growth process which would support his hypothesis.  
 
Schumpeter’s careful qualifications to this argument are not maintained by his more 
recent followers. Here the approach tends to be far more assertive, assuming both 
that Kondratiev waves exist and that they are technology driven. The most 
                                                 
13 Schumpeter, op.cit., pp.61,115. 
14 Schumpeter, op.cit., p.115. 
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systematic work is by Christopher Freeman, one of the most influential modern 
writers on innovation and technological change, in collaboration with Carlotta Perez 
and Luc Soete.  It is in  the very influential paper by Freeman and Perez, 
Schumpeter’s approach is systematised, and then developed into an argument that 
the key driving force of growth at this time is ICT.15 The explanatory framework on 
offer is explicitly that of Schumpeter, summed up by the type of schema shown in 
Figure 1.  
)LJXUH&OXVWHUVRISHUYDVLYHWHFKQRORJLHVV\VWHPVDQGRUJDQL]DWLRQ
3HULRG 1750-1820 1800-1870 1850-1940 1920-2000 1980 - 
      
’RPLQDQW
WHFKQRORJ\
V\VWHP 
Water 
power, sail 
shipping, 
turnpikes, 
textiles 
Coal, sail 
shipping, 
canals, 
iron,steam 
power, 
mechanical 
equipment 
Railways, 
steam ships, 
heavy 
industry, 
steel, 
chemicals, 
telegraph 
Electric power, 
oil, nuclear, 
cars, radio and 
TV, consumer 
durables, petro-
chemicals 
Gas, aircraft, 
space-based tele-
communications, 
information 
technology, opto-
electronics 
(PHUJLQJ
V\VWHP 
Mechanical 
techniques, 
coal, 
stationary 
steam, canals 
Steel, 
distributed 
energy 
supply, 
telegraph, 
railways 
Electricity, 
cars, trucks, 
radio, 
telephone, 
roads, 
chemicals 
Nuclear, 
computers and 
IT systems, tele-
communications
, air transport 
Biotechnology, 
AI, IT-telecom 
integration,  
’RPLQDQW
PHWKRGV
DQGRU
RUJDQL]DWLRQ 
Manufacture, 
localised 
enterprise 
Centrally 
managed 
enterprises, 
joint stock 
companies 
Standardised 
parts, M-form 
corporation 
Fordism/ 
Taylorism, mass 
production, 
TNCs. 
Quality control, 
globalised 
enterprises,  
de-centralised 
management 
 
In this framework, growth is driven by very radical technological changes that shift 
the entire ‘techno-economic paradigm’: this involves new forms of best-practice 
organization, new skill profiles in the labour force, new location patterns, new 
infrastructures, new consumption patterns, new types of dominant firms etc.16 A 
standard schema for this kind of account is shown in Figure 1 on the following page. 
The key point to note is that central to this kind of account is the larqe 
Schumpeterian technology change, which in the modern era is seen as ICT. 
 
In this work, and the substantial body of work influenced by it during the past 15 
years, it is very unclear how these very dramatic changes in the social and economic 
                                                 
15 C. Freeman and C. Perez, “Structural crises of adjustment: business cycles and investment 
behaviour” in G. Dosi et al eds, Technical Change and Economic Theory, (London: Pinter) 1988 
 
16 ibid., p.59 
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framework are actually related to ICT and new technologies generally.  
Nevertheless, this type of approach is frequently turned into an argument concerning 
the growth role of ICT at the present time. For example, Fagerberg et al  suggest 
that 
It is often argued that if the prospects for technological change and productivity 
growth differ across industries, countries that happen to be specialized in the 
technologically most progressive industries are likely to get a growth bonus. 
Conversely, the argument goes, countries that are specialized in the technologically 
lagging or ‘wrong’ industries tend to do rather badly.17 
The authors conclude that Europe has indeed failed to keep pace with its competitors, 
and has failed more generally in employment creation and growth. The conclusion is 
that what matters is 
…the ability to exploit areas of high technological opportunity, which in recent years 
have been dominated by ICT. However the analysis shows that Europe has lost 
ground in a number of strategically important sectors, particularly those related to 
ICT.18 
This type of neo-Schumpeterian argument has been dominant in policy circles for 
many years, and constitutes – as suggested above – one of the two core arguments for 
the claim that ICT is important in the shaping of growth.  
 
However there are many problems associated with these ideas, and there can be no 
doubt that the Kondratiev/Schumpeter approaches are open to a number of quite basic 
objections. Firstly, these approaches tend to conflate innovation and diffusion - they 
tend to assume that radical innovations generate rapid impacts. But this assumption is 
simply not supported in the various historical studies which have been made of some 
of the allegedly breakthrough technologies. These technologies, when examined 
closely, take a long time to diffuse and even longer to have an economic impact. (The 
same point can be argued of ICT at the present time – as we shall see below, there are 
serious empirical problems in claims that IT is driving growth at present). Secondly, 
these new sectors - even when fully diffused and established - do not necessarily 
                                                 
17 Fagerberg et al, op. cit., p.15.  This passage cites papers by Lucas and Reinert, the latter of which 
explicitly follows the Schumpeter-Freeman-Perez approach sketched above. It is important to note 
that neither Lucas nor Reinert offer any account of how or to what extent technological opportunity 
differs across sectors, of how this affects actual patterns of growth; each paper cited consists of bald 
assertions backed by neither argument nor evidence.  Although Fagerberg et al ask the question ‘can 
Europe’s performance be explained in this way’, they do not critically examine the idea – rather they 
and their contributors simply follow it by arguing that Europe’s ‘failure’ lies in ICT – see Chapters 3, 
4, 5 and 10 in particular.   
18 Ibid.p.230 
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contribute to output in a significant way. Obviously the automobile complex of 
industries grew to be a large element in output, but something like the hardware IT 
sector (ISIC 3825) does not make up more than about four percent of manufacturing 
output in any OECD economy. So although new technologies and new industries may 
exhibit rapid growth rates, they are invariably growing from very low levels, and the 
overall impact may be small. Thirdly, such theories obviously cannot account for 
growth in countries which do not possess the industries in question. This applies in 
particular to small economies. Referring back to Figure One, it is clear that these 
epochal shifts cannot account for growth in the Nordic area, in Switzerland, in 
Australia and New Zealand, in the Benelux countries, since on the whole these 
countries are not active in the allegedly core technologies of the various waves. A real 
problem here is that these are not only among the richest economies in the world, but 
several of them have been rapidly growing in the late 1990s. So these economies are 
characterised by high growth and high incomes, and yet are not significantly involved 
in these allegedly central technologies or industries.  
 7KHµ3URGXFWLYLW\*URZWK¶DUJXPHQW
During the past twenty or so years a substantial econometric literature has developed 
that seeks to place ICT in the context of an analysis of growth. For most of the past 
20 years, the results of this literature have been somewhat disappointing for 
proponents of the ICT revolution: ICT investments have been associated with falling 
productivity growth and appear to have made little impact on the growth process or 
on employment. The past two years, however have seen a dramatic change of 
position: a number of analysts have claimed that finally, at long last, ICT has made an 
impact. However this impact is largely confined to one economy: the claim  is that 
US growth in the late 1990s (that is from around 1995) has been driven by ICT 
investment. We should note, however, that this claim is by no means generally 
accepted.  
Both the conceptual and technical background to this work is the Solow growth 
model, developed in the 1950s. In the late 1950s a number of economists, the most 
important being Robert Solow, attempted to isolate the relative contributions of 
capital investment and technical change to the growth of productivity (output per 
worker) in the United States. In an important paper, Solow showed that the long-run 
growth of the US economy could not be ascribed to growth in labour or capital 
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inputs, but was primarily influenced by a "residual factor", which Solow labelled 
"technical change".19 This startling result led to a wide debate on the measurement of 
factors contributing to economic growth, as well as to attempts to explore the 
impacts of unmeasured quality changes in inputs, such as skills in the labour force. 
This led in turn to a transnational research programme "growth accounting", that 
attempted to quantify such factors as increasing labour skills, better capital goods, 
the role of technical change in shaping long-term growth patterns. One of the basic 
outcomes of this long programme of research has been that although technical 
change is no longer seen in quite the same dramatic terms as in Solow’s original 
paper, it is now consistently recognised as one of the basic forces underpinning 
economic growth. 
 
The basic neo-classical approach consists of a growth equation that relates output to 
the level of technology (a technology shift parameter) and inputs of capital and 
labour. These make it possible to look at the extent to which output grows 
independently of factor inputs – this is the residual, often labelled ‘technical change’. 
Much of the econometric work consists of attempts to quantify the impact of specific 
investments  or inputs, such as educational qualifications or ICT investments, on 
either productivity (output per worker) or total or multifactor productivity (that is, the 
impact on the residual).  
 
ICT has played a large part in this research effort in recent years. In a sense, many 
economists within the ‘productivity growth’ framework have taken up the notion that 
ICT is the core technological change of our period, and have attempted to quantify its 
impacts. This research tends to distinguish between GLUHFW impacts (the growth of ICT 
sectors, both in terms of output and employment), and LQGLUHFW impacts - the effects 
on other industries of the use of capital and intermediate goods from the ICT sector.  
How is ICT contributing to growth in user sectors?  If there is an indirect impact then 
we should see (a) higher productivity growth in firms that invest intensively in ICT, 
(b) higher productivity growth in sectors which are big ICT users, (c) higher than 
                                                 
19 Robert Solow, "Technical change and the aggregate production function", Review of Economics 
and Statistics, Vol 39 No 3, 1957, pp.312-320. See also Moses Abramowitz, "Resource and output 
trends in the United States since 1870", in N. Rosenberg The Economics of Technological Change 
(London 1971), pp.320-343. 
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average rates of return to investment in ICT than investment in the economy 
generally. There has been a major effort in applied economics to look at some these 
issues. The project will make a detailed critical overview of these efforts, seeking to 
assess their strengths and weaknesses.  
 
There are two significant bodies of work. The first is the substantial programme of 
work conducted through the Brookings Institute in Washington, primarily by Daniel 
Sichel, and published in a range of articles and one major book. This work attempts to 
quantify the size and productivity impacts of the ICT capital stock, both hardware and 
software; the validity of the analysis depends partly on the strength of these estimates, 
and partly on the ways in which impacts are quantitified.20 The second body of 
literature is unified by a method: the analysis of residual growth within a production 
function approach. That is, the method seeks to measure quality-adjusted labour and 
capital inputs, then to weigh these inputs according to their contributions to output, 
and finally to estimate output growth not accounted for by input growth. The latter is 
’total factor productivity’ growth, and the questions concern its correlations with the 
use of ICT.21 However there are serious measurement issues and questions of 
econometric technique embodied in this literature.
 
This overall effort to identify the benefits of ICT has had to face a major problem. 
This is that the ICT revolution has been underway for a very long period – at least 
since the 1960s. In a sense, this is not a new technology at all, it is a rather old one, 
and moreover a technology in which there has been significant amounts of investment 
over long periods. As Griliches pointed out 
… average TFP [total factor productivity] dropped from about 1.7% per year in 1947-
73 to less than 0.5% for the 1973-89 period. At the same time, Office Computing and 
Accounting Machinery (OCAM) as percent of all Producers’ Durable Equipment 
(PDE) investment rose from about ½% in the 1960s to 12% in 1992, while 
investment in “information” equipment rose from about 2% to close to 35% of the 
                                                 
20 S. Oliner and D. Sichel, 'Computers and output growth revisited: how big is the puzzle?', 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 1994, pp.273-317; and Daniel Sichel, The Computer 
Revolution. An Economic Perspective (Washington: Brookings Institution),  1997 
21 This literature begins in the late 1980s, and is continuing. For an early example, see Martin Neil 
Bailey and Robert Gordon, 'The productivity slowdown, measurement issues and the explosion of 
computer power', Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 1988, pp. 347 - 423; recent important 
contributions are D. Jorgensen and K.Stiroh, 'Information technology and growth', American 
Economic Review, May 1999,  pp. 109-116. Other results are surveyed below. 
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total. If the promise was that there would be an excess return to this investment, it 
was not delivered. Or else it was too small a fraction of the total to be noticed. 22 
Figure 2 sums up some of the research efforts to understand these problems.23 It can 
be noted that they tend to share both a methodology and a focus on the USA (the 
implications of which will be discussed further below). 
)LJXUH(FRQRPLFLPSDFWVRI,&7EDFNJURXQGUHVHDUFKUHVXOWV
.
H\
IL
QG
LQ
JV

La
rg
e-
sc
al
e 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 
IT
 c
ap
ita
l s
to
ck
 
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 
o
th
er
 
ca
pi
ta
l 
in
pu
ts,
 
co
u
pl
ed
 w
ith
 
st
ag
na
nt
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
,
 
su
gg
es
t n
o
 p
ay
of
f f
ro
m
 
IT
  
D
ec
lin
es
 in
 
ca
pi
ta
l 
pr
od
u
ct
iv
ity
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 sp
ec
ifi
c 
IT
 
in
n
o
v
at
io
n
s 
IT
 c
ap
ita
l h
as
 n
o
 
im
pa
ct
 
o
n
 p
ro
du
ct
iv
ity
 
co
m
pa
re
d 
to
 n
o
n
-IT
 
ca
pi
ta
l 
Fo
u
n
d 
sig
ni
fic
an
t 
im
pa
ct
 
o
f I
T 
o
n
 
pr
od
u
ct
iv
ity
 
bu
t 
se
rio
u
s 
do
ub
ts 
o
v
er
 
da
ta
 re
lia
bi
lit
y 
La
rg
e 
re
tu
rn
 o
n
 
IT
 
ca
pi
ta
l i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
(54
.2%
 
an
n
u
al
 
R
O
I);
 
pr
od
u
ct
iv
ity
 
pa
ra
do
x 
di
sa
pp
ea
re
d 
by
 1
99
1 
7\
SH
R
ID
QD
O\
VL
V
Tr
en
d 
co
m
pa
ris
on
s 
Ec
on
om
et
ric
 ti
m
e 
se
rie
s 
19
58
-1
98
3 
Ec
on
om
et
ric
 –
 
po
ol
ed
 cr
o
ss
 
se
ct
io
n
 a
n
d 
tim
e 
se
rie
s,
 
19
68
-8
6 
Ec
on
om
et
ric
 –
 
po
ol
ed
 cr
o
ss
 
se
ct
io
n
 a
n
d 
tim
e 
se
rie
s 
Ec
on
om
et
ric
 –
 
po
ol
ed
 cr
o
ss
 
se
ct
io
n
 a
n
d 
tim
e 
se
rie
s,
 
19
87
-9
1 
,Q
SX
WP
HD
VX
UH

To
ta
l I
T 
ca
pi
ta
l 
st
o
ck
 
To
ta
l I
T 
ca
pi
ta
l 
st
o
ck
 
To
ta
l I
T 
ca
pi
ta
l 
st
o
ck
 
IT
 c
ap
ita
l s
to
ck
 
M
ar
ke
t v
al
ue
 o
f 
co
m
pu
tin
g 
sto
ck
 
an
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
se
rv
ic
es
 
la
bo
ur
 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s 
3
HU
IR
UP
DQ
FH

FR
QF
HS
WV
D
QG

P
HD
VX
UH
V
La
bo
ur
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 
La
bo
ur
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 
La
bo
ur
 
an
d 
m
u
lti
fa
ct
or
 
pr
od
u
ct
iv
ity
,
 
an
d 
pr
o
fit
ab
ili
ty
 
M
ul
tif
ac
to
r 
pr
od
u
ct
iv
ity
 
La
bo
ur
 
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 
(ge
ne
ral
 an
d 
in
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
se
rv
ic
es
,
 
pl
u
s 
pr
o
fit
ab
ili
ty
 
8
QL
WR
ID
QD
O\
VL
V

DQ
G
FR
XQ
WU
\
Se
rv
ic
e 
se
ct
or
 - 
U
SA
 
In
su
ra
n
ce
 a
n
d 
ba
nk
in
g 
-
 
U
SA
 
20
 M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
in
du
str
ie
s 
-
U
SA
 
M
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
- 
U
SA
 
Fi
rm
 
le
ve
l i
n 
U
S 
m
an
u
fa
ct
u
rin
g 
$
XW
KR
UV

R
o
ac
h 
19
91
 
Fr
an
ke
 1
98
7 
M
or
ris
o
n
 a
n
d 
Be
rn
dt
 
19
90
 
an
d 
19
92
 
Si
eg
el
 a
nd
 
G
ril
ic
he
s 1
99
1 
B
ry
njo
lfs
so
n
 
an
d 
H
itt
 1
99
3 
 
 
                                                 
22 Z. Griliches, “Comments on measurement issues in relating IT expenditures to productivity 
growth”, Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Vol 3, 1995, p.317 
23 Drawn from Wilson 1995, p.237-238 
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It is only very recently that a literature has emerged claiming unambiguously that ICT 
investment has driven the growth of the US economy since 1995. Over the period 
1995-2000, US productivity growth was at record levels, and this was accompanied 
by significant increases in ICT investment. Oliner and Sichel (2000) and Jorgenson 
and Stiroh (2000) have each claimed that this is the long-awaited pay-off to ICT 
investment.   
 
We can suggest, however, a number of problems with this literature. The most 
important issues to note are: 
 7KHPHWKRGRORJ\RIHFRQRPHWULFPRGHOOLQJEDVHGRQVRPH IRUPRISURGXFWLRQ IXQFWLRQLQYROYHV
WKHXQGHUO\LQJDVVXPSWLRQWKDWWKHHFRQRP\LVLQVRPHIRUPRIFRPSHWLWLYHHTXLOLEULXP,QHIIHFW
WKH PRGHOV RSHUDWH E\ DVVXPLQJ WKDW LQYHVWPHQW LQ FRPSXWLQJ LV UDWLRQDO DQG WKDW ,&7
LQYHVWPHQWVHDUQDFRPSHWLWLYH UDWHRI UHWXUQ– LQ VRPHFDVHV LWPLJKWEHDUJXHG WKDW WKLV LV WR
DVVXPHZKDWQHHGVWREHSURYHG
 ,Q XQGHUVWDQGLQJ WKH JURZWK SURFHVV WKH DVVXPSWLRQ LV WKDW JURZWK FDQ RQO\ IROORZ IURP QHZ
LQSXWV DQG WKH WHFKQRORJLFDO DGYDQFHV HPERGLHG LQ WKHP ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV PDFURHFRQRPLF
SRVVLELOLWLHV VXFK DV H[RJHQRXV VKRFNV WR GHPDQG DUH QRW FRQVLGHUHG ,Q WKH 86 WKLV LV
SDUWLFXODUO\LPSRUWDQWVLQFHWKHSHULRGLQZKLFK,&7LVVDLGWRKDYHSDLGRIIZDVRQHLQZKLFKD
PDMRUPDFURHFRQRPLFVKLIWDSSHDUHG–WKH86VDYLQJVUDWHIHOOWR]HUR7KHLPSOLFDWLRQVRIVXFK
GHYHORSPHQWVIRURXWSXWJURZWKDQGWKHPHDVXUHPHQWRI,&7LPSDFWVDUHQRWH[SORUHG
3. 7KHVHPRGHOVDUH LQYDULDEO\RQO\ IRU WKH86$DQG WKLV VKRXOGEHERUQH LQPLQGZKHQµJOREDO¶
FRQFOXVLRQVDERXW,&7DUHGUDZQ,WLVSDUWLFXODUO\LPSRUWDQWWRQRWHWKDWWKH86LVQRWWKHRQO\
UDSLGO\JURZLQJHFRQRP\ LQDQG LQ IDFW LVQRW WKHZRUOG¶V IDVWHVWJURZLQJHFRQRP\
GXULQJ WKLV SHULRG :LWKLQ WKH 2(&’ DQG WKH WUDQVLWLRQDO HFRQRPLHV SURGXFWLYLW\ LQ WKH ODWH
VJUHZDWSD LQ WKH86$EXW LWJUHZ IDVWHU LQ$XVWUDOLD$XVWULD%HOJLXP)LQODQG
+XQJDU\*UHHFH,UHODQG,FHODQG3RODQG3RUWXJDO6ZHGHQDQG7XUNH\3UHVXPDEO\,&7ZDV
SDUWRIWKHJURZWKVWRU\LQ,UHODQGDQG)LQODQGEXWLWLVYHU\KDUGWREHOLHYHWKDWLWXQGHUSLQQHG
WKLVYHU\ZLGHVSUHDGVWRU\RIHFRQRPLFJURZWK,IZHUHDOO\ZDQWWRXQGHUVWDQGWKHLPSDFWVRI,&7
ZHQHHGPRUHWKDQSDUWLDOVWXGLHVRIWKH86$ 
 (PSLULFDODVSHFWVRIORQJUXQJURZWKLQ(XURSHDQG2(&’
On of the curious features of the claims concerning ICT is that they are rarely tested 
against empirical evidence in the broad sense. For example, when it is claimed that 
ICT is central to growth, this is rarely checked against the growth of other industries, 
or against the growth of countries other than the USA. In this section we look at the 
role of ICT in two ways. First, we look at its GLUHFW contribution to output and growth. 
                                                 
24 OECD 2000 Table 1, p.21 
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That is, we look at how much it contributes to value-added, employment, R&D and 
so on in the OECD countries. This contribution is surprisingly small. Then we look at 
the contribution of ICT to growth, introducing a simple formal framework for 
identifying this contribution, and showing the broad dimensions of ICT and non-ICT 
sectors. The argument here is that the on-ICT sectors are far more important. The 
question then arises, what about the LQGLUHFW contribution of ICT? Here we look at 
Norwegian data on the use of highly-qualified ICT personnel in user industries; we 
show that the indirect contribution is large.  
High-tech  and science-based industries. 
Before moving to a specific analysis of ICT in in industry, it is necessary to make a 
diversion via the concept of ‘high-technology’. In much policy analysis it is 
common to use the terms 'high-technology' or 'knowledge intensive industries' in a 
somewhat loose way, as though in fact they are both meaningful and 
interchangeable terms. But we ought to remember that the term ‘high technology’ is 
a rather recent invention, and that its meaning is far from clear. For the most part, it 
actually means ‘ICT’. 
 
The standard approach in this area rests on a classification developed by the OECD 
in the mid-1980s.25 The OECD distinguished between industries in terms of R&D 
intensities, with those (such as ICT or pharmaceuticals) spending more than 4% of 
turnover being classified as high-technology, those spending between 1% and 4% of 
turnover (such as vehicles or chemicals) being classified as medium-tech, and those 
spending less than 1% (such as textiles or food) as 'low tech'. In fact the OECD 
discussion of this classification was rather careful, and offered many qualifications. 
Chief among these is the point that direct R&D is but one indicator of knowledge 
content, and that technology intensity is not mapped solely by R&D. Unfortunately 
the qualifications were forgotten in practice, and this classification has taken on a 
life of its own; it is widely used, both in policy circles and in the press, as a basis for 
talking about knowledge-intensive as opposed to traditional or non-knowledge-
intensive industries. This is a serious problem, since the OECD classification as it is 
used rests on only one indicator, namely intramural R&D. This is open to two 
important objections. First, it is by no means the only measure of knowledge-
                                                 
25 See OECD, OECD Science and Technology Indicators, No 2: R&D, Innovation and 
Competitiveness, (OECD:Paris), pp. 58-61. 
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creating activities. Second, it ignores the fact that the knowledge that is relevant to 
an industry may be distributed across many sectors or agents: thus a low-R&D 
industry may well be a major user of knowledge generated elsewhere. This issue 
will be discussed in a more empirical manner below. 
 
Even so it is not clear that this classification helps us, even in a limited analysis of 
trends. One great problem is that in fact the high-tech sector thus defined is small, 
and there are therefore some difficulties in arguing that it is driving the growth 
process. In the OECD, for example, the USA has the largest share of high-tech in 
manufacturing, but this is only 15.8% of manufacturing output, which in turn is only 
18.5% of GDP.  So the high-tech sector is less than 3% of GDP.  It is hard to see 
how either the direct or indirect impacts of such a small component of output could 
have a significant effect on overall economic growth. Most discussions of the role of 
high-tech are conducted in terms of share analyses, or even – in effect - share-of-
share analyses. This can easily confuse matters. In virtually all of the OECD 
economies the share of high-tech in total manufacturing has risen in the longer term, 
and this is widely used as an argument for the claim that such industries are central 
to growth. However this is complicated by the fact that that the share of 
manufacturing in total output has been in long-term decline. So between 1980 and 
1995, the high-tech share of US manufacturing increased from 10.5% to 15.8%, 
while the share of manufacturing in GNP decreased from 21.6% to 18.5%. What 
this actually implies is that the share of high-tech manufacturing in total GNP rose 
over fifteen years by well under one percentage point.26  It is not uncommon to see 
quite sweeping claims made for the high-tech sector which are not supported by 
readily available evidence. For example, OECD’s .QRZOHGJH %DVHG (FRQRP\ 
claims that ‘Output and employment are expanding fastest in high-technology 
industries, such as computers, electronics and aerospace’.27 But the OECD’s own 
‘Scoreboard of Indicators’ actually shows long-term QHJDWLYH growth rates of 
employment in high-tech manufacturing in eleven of fifteen OECD countries for 
which data are presented (including the USA, where high-tech employment declined 
at a faster rate than manufacturing employment generally). 
                                                 
26 All of the data here is drawn from OECD, Science, Technology and Industry, Scoreboard of 
Indicators, 1997. 
27 Op. Cit., p.9 
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Such problems have not led to any questioning of the high-tech/low-tech distinction. 
On the contrary, the high-medium-low-tech approach has recently been extended, to 
divide the medium-tech category into medium-high and medium-low technology 
industries. Such classificatory manoeuvres cannot, however, alter the fundamental 
limitations of the category, and ought to cause us to question the identification of 
knowledge intensive and high-tech industries. 
ICT in the economic structure: the direct role of ICT 
Most definitions of the ICT sector relate to office equipment and computing, 
scientific and technical instruments, and telecommunications. In this section e look 
briefly at ICT as a share of  business employment, business R&D, business trade, and 
business value added in OECD countries. In general these contributions are low. 
Within the OECD as a whole, ICT makes up less than 4% of business employment. 
The countries of the Nordic area (Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark) are all 
above the OECD average.  But in general the direct employment contribution is 
small, even in above-average countries. 
)LJXUH,&7HPSOR\PHQWDVVKDUHRIWRWDOEXVLQHVVHPSOR\PHQWLQ2(&’FRXQWULHV
 
 
In terms of R&D, the picture is different. ICT is in general terms the largest single 
sector of R&D performance – on average, the ICT sector account for around 35% of 
business R&D.  
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)LJXUH5	’H[SHQGLWXUHVDVVKDUHRIWRWDOEXVLQHVV5	’LQ2(&’FRXQWULHV
 
 
For most of the OECD ICT is only a small component of business trade – roughly 12 
percent. However there are a number of outlier countries, particularly Ireland which 
has become established as a major production site for ICT-related Foreign Direct 
Investment.  
)LJXUH,&7WUDGHDVVKDUHRIWRWDOEXVLQHVVWUDGHLQ2(&’FRXQWULHV
 
 
As with employment, ICT is a relatively small part of business value added in the 
OECD, so the direct output contribution tends to be small.  
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)LJXUH,&7VKDUHRIEXVLQHVVYDOXHDGGHGLQYDULRXV2(&’FRXQWULHV
 
 
It can be noted that these features of the direct contribution of ICT have not altered 
very much over the long run. Figure 5 shows the trends for ICT as a share of 
manufacturing in a number of OECD countries during the 14 years from 1980 to 
1993. The point to note is that the shares are both stable and low: 
)LJXUH9DOXHDGGHG LQ ,&7PDQXIDFWXULQJ LQGXVWULHV YDULRXV2(&’FRXQWULHV ,6,&
DQGSource: OECD, STAN. 
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Measuring ICT user competencies: indirect roles of ICT28 
Information and communication technologies are generic technologies. This means 
they can be implemented and used in many industries and sectors – the graphics 
industry, the energy sector, clinical medicine, food processing, and the public sector 
are among user areas that have significantly invested in and implemented ICT tools 
the last decade. Car manufacturing is increasingly robotised, there exist digitalised, 
automated milking machines for cows, taxis use both digital pay systems, global 
positioning systems and advanced telecommunications, kitchen ovens are 
programmed to sense when food is ready, etc. A huge amount of activities around us 
is therefore based in some way on use of ICT.  
 
At the same time, ICT-based systems become increasingly user-friendly, and so use 
is to a decreasing extent preconditioned on direct technological knowledge for 
operation operate: taxi drivers use digital pay systems without knowing what is going 
on inside the pay card reader, etc. It is increasingly simple to exploit the possibilities 
of ICT without knowing the technological details of the technology. However this 
does not mean that ICT has become a standardised commodity. People with higher 
education in, and technological knowledge about, IC graduate in increasing numbers 
from universities and colleges. When they go into employment, people in 
information services continue to receive above-average wages, indicating that ICT 
competencies are still in excess demand.  
 
We can therefore assume that companies hiring persons with ICT competencies 
would do so because they have some kind of active relation to ICT – beyond 
ordinary consumption of standardised technology. Hiring ICT skilled persons would 
indicate that the given company is actively developing, adapting or adopting IC-
technology. Persons with formal skills in ICT start to work in companies that 
specifically need these kinds of competencies. What we seek to do in this section is 
overview the extent to which this occurs outside the ICT sector itself. We therfore 
seek to map the use of ICT competences outside the ICT sector itself. 
 
Norway has exceptionally detailed data on the qualifications and mobility patterns of 
all persons employed in the economy, and this data is available via the ‘labour force 
                                                 
28 This section was written in collaboration with Thor Egil Braadland. 
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register’. The mapping carried out here uses person-level register data to idetnify the 
location of persons with formal ICT competencies. Looking at employees’ highest 
education, we identify persons with ICT-related formal skills. Using ICT education 
as a proxy to ICT competencies, it is possible to identify companies, industries and 
regions with high shares of employees with formal ICT skills?.29 
 
First we should acknolwedge a number of drawbacks with this way of mapping ICT 
competencies. First, register data is a combination of data from many public datasets 
gathering a wide range of employee and company information. This means that there 
of course are, as in all large datasets, mistakes, missing values, wrong codes for 
companies, industry, location, employees etc. The set is, however, as good as it can 
be. The aggregate data is collected and joined by Statistics Norway. Second, we only 
have access to the KLJKHVWexam results per individual. This means that a person with 
an ICT exam as a part of a higher degree in social science will not be covered by our 
statistics. A person with the same ICT exam ZLWKRXW the social science degree will be 
covered. This is regrettable, but is the only way to identify ICT personnel as long as 
every person in the register is denoted with only one (the highest) passed exam. 
Third, we equate ICT skills with formal education in ICT. There exist of course 
many persons that have no qualifications in ICT, but with operational skills in the 
topic. We have reason to believe that this group of people is not insignificant, given 
the fact that ICT skills have been in demand for quite some years now. We have no 
possibility to map real competencies, but we fully accept its existence. Fourth, 
persons are counted as one with no regards to how high a degree or exam they have 
in ICT related topics. A person with only one year from college and a full PhD from 
a university are both counted as one. Fifth, persons are accounted for with no regards 
to what their actual activities in the job are. An ICT student working part-time as 
postman will turn up in the statistics as one person with ICT competencies working 
                                                 
29 We use the Statistics Norway dataset for employees, 1989-1999. The register data contains data on 
person-level, with every employees’ highest education (six digit standard UNESCO ISCED codes). In 
addition, every employee is tagged with company size the person is working in, company’s industry 
(NACE 5 digit), company’s location (municipality), among others. By manually deciding what 
educational directions and or levels we regarded as being ICT-related, we were able to pick those 
employees in Norway with formal ICT competence, and decide their location with respect to 
industries, regions and company sizes. There are about 6.000 education codes, but most of them are on 
levels below higher education. We decided to go for higher educated personnel. We sorted manually 
out those educations that seemed ICT-related; i.e. containing ‘computing’, ‘electronics’, 
‘programming’, ‘cybernetics’, ‘DAK/DAP’, ‘informatics’, ‘programming’, ‘telecommunication’ etc. 
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in Transport and Communications. There is unfortunately no way to separate 
employees by function in the dataset.  
 
Including all ICT related higher education, we find a total of 26651 employees with 
ICT competencies in Norway in 1999. This represents about 1.4 percent of total 
employment in Norway this year. Using an aggregated NACE categorisation on 
industrial activities (see Appendix for list), we find that about 57 percent of 
employees with ICT competencies worked in ICT user industries – defining user-
industries as all industries except Electronic and optical industry and Business 
services and computing30. The most intensive ICT user industries (measured as ICT 
competencies as share of total industrial employment) are: Power and water supply, 
Oil extraction, Manufacturing of machinery and equipment, Chemicals, Transport 
and communication and Manufacturing of transportation equipment. All these user 
industries had more than 15 ICT-skilled persons per 1.000 employees in 1999. 
However, the most ICT-intensive industries were: Electronic and optical industry and 
Business services/computing, with respectively 113 and 48 ICT-skilled persons per 
1.000 employees (Table 2). 
7DEOH,QGXVWULHVZLWKKLJKVKDUHVRI,&7VNLOOHGHPSOR\HHV
,QGXVWU\
,&7VNLOOHG
HPSOR\HHV
,&7VNLOOHGHPSOR\HHV
SHUHPSOR\HHV
Electronic and optical industry 2537 113 
Business services, computing 8655 48 
Power and water supply 744 42 
Oil extraction 726 28 
Machinery and equipment 651 28 
Chemicals 284 17 
Transport and communication 2556 17 
Man. of transportation equipment 617 16 
Financial services 636 14 
Other services 779 12 
Pulp and paper 103 11 
Public adm., defence 1548 10 
 
                                                                                                                                          
We ended up wit a list of 129 education levels (see Appendix for list [in Norwegian]). This is the 
canonical list we use from now on. 
30 One may critise us for using a traditional two-split between ICT producer and ICT user, and 
thereby ignoring the transmitting, ‘in-between’ role of the ICT consulting services. Such services are 
of huge importance in terms of national ICT capabilities, and could well have formed a third category. 
For simplicity, however, we have categorised this industry as ‘producer industry’, because 
’computing’ is a part of the Business service, computing industry group used here. 
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However, looking at mere numbers of employees with formal ICT competencies, 
large activities like Retail and Public administration and Defence come quite high on 
the list. For example, about 11 percent of all ICT-skilled persons are working in 
Retail, which is actually higher than the number of ICT-skilled persons working in 
Electronic and optical industry.  
7DEOH,QGXVWULHVZLWKPRVW,&7VNLOOHGSHUVRQVLQ1RUZD\
,QGXVWU\
1XPEHURI
,&7VNLOOHGSHUVRQV
6KDUHRIDOO
,&7VNLOOHGSHUVRQV
Business services, computing 8655 33,0 % 
Retail 2873 11,0 % 
Transport and communication 2556 9,8 % 
Electronic and optical industry 2537 9,7 % 
Public adm., defence 1548 5,9 % 
Teaching, education 1470 5,6 % 
Other services 779 3,0 % 
Building and construction 775 3,0 % 
Power and water supply 744 2,8 % 
Oil extraction 726 2,8 % 
Machinery and equipment 651 2,5 % 
Financial services 636 2,4 % 
Man. of transportation equipment 617 2,4 % 
 
How has the amount and distribution of ICT skills changed over the years? The 
number of employees with formal ICT-competencies has of course increased. The 
increase  from 1989 to 1999 was about 50 percent, from 17.673 persons to 26.281. 
The increase has been fairly stable from year to year, measured in number of new 
entrants. However, beyond the surface there are interesting patterns. This is shown in 
Figure 8, showing yearly change in (i) ICT employment as share of total 
employment, (ii) share of ICT-skilled persons working in producer industry and (iii) 
share of ICT-skilled persons working in user industries.  
)LJXUH<HDUO\FKDQJHLQL,&7HPSOR\PHQWDVVKDUHRIWRWDOHPSOR\PHQWLLVKDUHRI,&7VNLOOHG
SHUVRQV ZRUNLQJ LQ SURGXFHU LQGXVWU\ DQG LLL VKDUH RI ,&7VNLOOHG SHUVRQV ZRUNLQJ LQ XVHU
LQGXVWULHVWR
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The figure shows two interesting findings. First, the growth of ICT-skilled 
employees as share of the economy was largest in the first half of the 90s, with 
yearly increases in shares on four to six percent. From 1996 and on, the yearly 
increase in share has been much lower, on average about 1 percent. Second, there is a 
marked shift from ICT user industries towards ICT producer industries. We see in 
the figure that change in share of ICT-skilled persons working in the user industry 
has been negative throughout the 90s, to the advantage of producer industries. In 
1989, two out of three persons with formal ICT skills worked in user industries. 10 
years later, the share is reduced to about 57 percent.  
 
The producer industry that has increased most is Business services and computing, 
with almost 5.000 new ICT-skilled persons in the ten-year period. This represents 
more than half of all new ICT-skilled persons entering working life in this period. 
Other industries with substantial increases in ICT capabilities are Transport and com-
munication, Public administration, Defence, Retail and Health Services.  
7DEOH  7RS LQGXVWULHV ZLWK KLJKHVW LQFUHDVH LQ ,&7 FDSDELOLWLHV  PHDVXUHG LQ QHZ
HPSOR\HHVZLWK,&7FDSDELOLWLHV
,QGXVWU\
,QFUHDVH
SVW
,QFUHDVH
HPSO
6KDUHRIWRWDOQXPEHU
RIQHZ,&7HPSOR\HHV
Business services, computing 134,5 % 4964 57,7 %
Transport and communication 34,4 % 654 7,6 %
Public adm., defence 44,1 % 474 5,5 %
Retail 17,4 % 425 4,9 %
Health services 138,6 % 287 3,3 %
Electronic and optical industry 12,6 % 284 3,3 %
Man. of transportation equipment 79,9 % 274 3,2 %
Machinery and equipment 63,6 % 253 2,9 %
Other services 40,1 % 223 2,6 %
Financial services 53,6 % 222 2,6 %
Chemicals 127,2 % 159 1,8 %
 
There are also some interesting findings regarding distribution of ICT competencies 
across different company size classes. Table 4 provides an overview of how 
employees with ICT competencies are distributed by company size class, compared 
to distribution of employees with any higher education in the same classes. The table 
shows that large companies have a much higher share of ICT competent people than 
small companies have, compared with the distribution of higher educated employees 
in general. Large companies (100+ employees) employ about 40 percent of all 
employees with higher education, but more than 52 percent of all employees with 
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ICT competencies. For companies with 1-49 employees, the share is about 45 
percent of those with higher education and only 34 percent of the employees with 
ICT competencies.  
7DEOH  ’LVWULEXWLRQ RI HPSOR\HHV ZLWK ,&7 FRPSHWHQFLHV E\ FRPSDQ\ VL]H FODVV FRPSDUHG WR
GLVWULEXWLRQRIHPSOR\HHVZLWKDQ\KLJKHUHGXFDWLRQ1RUZD\
&RPSDQ\VL]HFODVV
’LVWULEXWLRQRIHPSOR\HHV
ZLWKKLJKHUHGXFDWLRQ
’LVWULEXWLRQRIHPSOR\HHVZLWK
IRUPDO,&7FRPSHWHQFLHV
1-9 14,5 % 10,5 % 
10-49 30,8 % 23,0 % 
50-99 15,4 % 14,5 % 
100+ 39,3 % 52,1 % 
All companies 100,0 % 100,1 % 
 
We also find an uneven regional distribution of employees with ICT competencies. 
)LJXUH1XPEHURI,&7VNLOOHGHPSOR\HHVSHUHPSOR\HHVE\FRXQW\1RUZD\
4 - 7 
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The map in Figure 9 shows number of ICT-skilled employees per 1.000 employees, 
by county. There are two main areas for ICT competence. This is (i) the Oslo and 
Akershus counties (south east, the capital area), and the Trondheim region (mid 
Norway). Both areas are shaded darker than the other regions. The capital region is 
characterised  by a large share of ICT companies (both manufacturing and 
consulting), many R&D departments, University of Oslo and the Kjeller research 
park31. The Trondheim region is recognised by NTNU (a major technological 
university), SINTEF (Norway’s largest research institute group) and a range of ICT 
companies. In addition, the map shows two more regions with more than 12 ICT-
competent employees per 1.000 employees. These are (i) the two counties of 
Buskerud and Vestfold (west of the capital area) and (ii) the Aust-Agder region 
(southern Norway). Both Buskerud, Vestfold and Aust-Agder have important 
technical colleges and large ICT companies (see Braadland 1998 for details).  
 
The most important outcome of this mapping has been to demonstrate empirically 
how ICT activities are more than what is commonly measured by using traditional 
industry statistics. Using ICT competencies as a gateway to ICT activities, we can 
see that about 50 percent of ICT activity is taking place in user industries.  
 
The results from this mapping are interesting in three ways. First, The mapping pro-
vides a quantitative measurement of the extent of ICT activities in user industries, 
which has not been done in a broad way before. Second, insofar as ICT technologies 
are important aspects of innovation activities, the distribution of ICT competencies 
are of crucial importance to understand actual and future innovative capability. Fi-
nally, these results are important in signalling the need further work on creating 
comparable statistics for other European countries on use and diffusion of informa-
tion and communication technologies. Hitherto, only the Nordic countries have gath-
ered such detailed information.  
 
It is probably going too far to draw strong conclusions from this data. However on 
the one hand it does seem to suggest that the economics of ICT are going to be very 
strongly shaped by the distribution of ICT skills across industries. On the other, it 
suggests that ICT as a technology is not necessarily being shaped by the ICT indus-
                                                 
31 Braadland et al (1998) 
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tries themselves.  That is to say, user industries are very likely playing a key role in 
the evolution and shaping of ICT itself. This of coruse depends a great deal on some-
thing we know little about, namely the links between users and producers of ICT 
products and services. There are more questions than answers here, but the implica-
tions are important. Given (as we have shown above) the small size of the ICT sec-
tor, it may well be that policy ought to focus on the sectors that really generate 
employment and output, namely the user sectors. 

  
 31
&KDSWHU :KDWLV
,&7
"
One very basic analytical problem is the assumption that we have good concepts and 
definitions of ICT, both as a technology and as an economic activity. This is not 
necessarily the case, however, and it is important to give some consideration to the 
notion of ICT itself. The question here is not simply whether we can think of ICT as 
an industrial sector, or even a more or less unified industrial activity. It is also 
whether it makes sense to speak of ICT as a unified technology, or whether it is in 
fact many technologies, perhaps only loosely related to each other. As we shall see, 
this process of differentiation within the technology is very important in 
understanding differences on productivity, skill levels, work organisation and quality, 
the income generating effects of ICT, and so on. At the most basic level, within both 
manufacturing and services, we can distinguish between  
 
• &RQVXPHUHOHFWURQLFV79YLGHRDQGDXGLR3&VWHOHSKRQ\UDGLRHWF
• (OHFWURQLFFRPSRQHQWVWKDWLVHOHFWURQLFGHYLFHVLQFRUSRUDWHGLQ
ILQDOSURGXFWVRIRWKHUVHFWRUV
• 3URIHVVLRQDOHOHFWURQLFVPHDQLQJWKHH[WUHPHO\EURDGDUUD\RI
SURGXFWVZLWKLQLQGXVWULDOHOHFWURQLFVVXFKDVURERWVPDFKLQHWRROV
SURFHVVDQGFRQWUROHTXLSPHQWLQVWUXPHQWVPHGLFDOWHFKQRORJLHV
DQGGHIHQFHHOHFWURQLFV
• 7HOHPDWLFVPHDQLQJDOOHTXLSPHQWDQGVHUYLFHVLQYROYHGLQGLIIXVLQJ
LQIRUPDWLRQLPDJHVDQGVRXQG
• 6HUYLFHSURYLVLRQLQFOXGLQJYRLFHQHWZRUNVFDEOHPRELOHDQG
VDWHOOLWHFRPPXQLFDWLRQVGDWDWUDQVPLVVLRQQHWZRUNVHWF 
 
Within software development and delivery we should make similar distinctions - 
ranging from activities related to architectures and languages, to very wide arrays of 
professional and personal software, to different types of content providers, where 
quite different types of organization and skills are required.  This kind of approach 
can be extended almost without limit. As Houghton et al remark: 
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Seen either in broader or narrow terms the information industries are highly complex 
and diffuse. There are few traditional industrial classifications that escape inclusion in 
whole or part in the broader conceptualisations of the information sector or 
information economy. Even in narrower conceptualisations focusing on the IT-
producing industries, almost anything from pulp and paper to multimedia content, 
from components (electronic and otherwise) to supercomputers and from cables to 
consulting services are elements of the IT industries. Faced with such a situation, 
developing a simple yet functional model of the IT industries is a major challenge.32 
 
What is needed here is classificatory and taxonomic work, to untangle the content of 
’ICT’ with a view to understanding the different skills levels, entry conditions, pricing 
behaviour, and growth characteristics of the activity concerned. These are important 
issues in understanding the growth effects of ICT - it is not obvious, for example, that 
all aspects of ICT are new, or that high value-added activities, or that they create 
knowledge externalities, or other desirable economic effects.  
 
In seeking to define the technology, we can distinguish between four major 
dimensions of information gathering, processing and dissemination. Houghton et al 
make a four-way distinction. In the area of products, we can distinguish between 
information and communications equipment, on the one hand, and information 
products (such as software and contents) on the other. In the area of services we can 
distinguish communications services (meaning broadly the services need to make 
communications hardware work), and information services (meaning the services 
need to make information products accessible). A cross-cutting categorization 
distinguishes between transmission channels (what Houghton et al call 
‘Form/Conduit’) and content. This leads to a broad classification as follows: 
 
                                                 
32 J.W. Houghton, M. Pucar, and C. Know, ‘Mapping Information Technology’, Futures, Vol. 28 
No.10, pp.903-917, 1996. 
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What emerges here is a pattern of considerable complexity, in which ICT can be seen 
as a very wide array of technologies and activities. In this kind of approach, it is 
important to note that some sections of the activity are likely to be highly innovative 
and knowledge intensive (such as work on semiconducting materials or 
architectures) while others are likely to take the form of low value-added commodity 
production. The relevant conclusion is that it, in talking about ICT, it is extremely 
important to distinguish among its components – only a few are likely to play 
important roles in innovation and growth. 
 
Other approaches to ICT have focussed not on the technology, but on the category of 
‘information’, and the employment patterns associated with it, The first significant 
attempt to overcome the statistical problems was the work of the economist Fritz 
Machlup.33 Machlup reorganised the industrial classification of the US into five 
major groups of information activities: education, research, communications, 
information equipment and information services. Studying output and employment 
trends in these activity groups, he showed through an analysis of the US national 
accounts that such activities accounted for 29% of US BNP and 31% of employment 
in 1958. Moreover during the previous ten years the information sector had been 
growing at twice the rate of the economy as a whole, indicating a substantial 
structural shift in the US economy.  
 
Machlup's work was significantly extended in the mid-1970s in a very detailed nine-
volume study for the US Department of Commerce by Marc Uri Porat.34 Porat 
distinguished between a "primary information sector" consisting of firms which 
supplied information goods and services of all kinds, and a "secondary information 
sector"  consisting of "all the information services produced for internal consumption 
by government and noninformation firms." He showed that the two sectors taken 
together accounted for 46% of US BNP, 40% of the workforce, and 53% of labour 
income. More recent estimates for the mid-1980s suggest that over 50% of the 
                                                 
33 F. Machlup, The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States (Princeton, NJ, 
1962), and Knowledge: Its Creation, Distribution and Economic Significance (Princeton, NJ, 1980). 
34 The main body of Porat’s research is reported in The Information Economy: Definition and 
Measurement, 256pp, and The Information Economy: Sources and Methods for Measuring the 
Primary Information Sector, 188pp., US Dept of Commerce Office of Telecommunications, (OT 
Spec.Pub 77-12-1), 1977. 
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American workforce were then in the information sector, and that nearly 70% of 
labour costs and 70% of working hours relate to information (since information 
workers receive higher wages and work longer hours).35 These information industries 
have much higher investment rates than other sectors of the economy: in the 1980s 
the capital stock of US "information producing" industries grew at 5% p.a., while the 
manufacturing capital stock grew at less than 2% p.a.  It should be noted in this 
context that IT investment is concentrated such service industries, which by the late 
1980s owned 84% of the US stock of IT equipment.36 These trends in the US 
economy are probably consistent with trends in other advanced economies. They 
have in various places been used to argue that since the ‘information sector’ is so 
large, then the ICT sector must be of major economic importance. In Norway, for 
example, Porat’s approach to information has been followed by Egil Wulff, who then 
identifies information with knowledge, and concludes that the ‘kunnskapssektor’ is 
the largest economic activity in Norway. 37 This of course makes the same mistake as 
those who identify all pieces of IT hardware as equally knowledge intensive. 
                                                 
35 E.M. Rogers, Communication Technology. The New Media in Society (New York, 1986), pp.10-
13. 
36 S. Roach, "Technology and the services sector: America’s hidden competitive challenge", in B. 
Guile and J. Quinn, Technology in Services (Washington, 1988), ss.118-137 
37 Egil Wulff, Kunnskaps- og IT Sektor I Norge Investorforum Rapport 2/96 
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&KDSWHU +RZDGHTXDWHDUH
H[LVWLQJVWDWLVWLFDOIUDPHZRUNV"
Many of the problems in analysing ICT stem from the fact that ICT does not 
correspond to any straightforward category within the major sets of industrial 
statistics. At the present time we have two such classifications: NACE (the standard 
used by the European Union), and ISIC (the standard used more generally in the 
OECD). These classifications have important differences, particularly in the treatment 
of the relation between manufacturing and services. However they also have 
important features in common. In each of the classifications there are serious 
difficulties in arguing that ICT is an important sector of the economy. Within the 
ISIC classification, for example, hardware ICT is not a particularly large sector - if 
we take together the three broad industries ’office equipment and computers’ , 
’technical and scientific instruments’, and ’telecommunications equipment’, then there 
is no OECD economy in which these sectors combined make up more than about 
15% of manufacturing output. In most OECD economies the manufacturing sector 
makes up about 25% or less of GNP (in Norway, manufacturing is 17% of GNP). So 
hardware ICT is in all cases only a very small component of GNP. Software, however 
it is measured, is also a relatively small sector. Within these definitions, ICT as a 
proportion of overall economic activity has not changed very signficantly over time, 
either. These considerations alone make it difficult to claim that ICT has any very 
noticeable measured contribution to growth. 
 
These problems have led to considerable debate and work on ICT-related statistics, 
and any assessment of the economics of ICT must evaluate this statistical effort.  In 
particular, the OECD has had a working group on these issues which seeks to 
redefine ICT in terms of company’s ’main line of business’.38 The issues are complex, 
but essentially the ICT sector is redefined through this work as all electronics-using 
hardware, all software production and distribution, all telecommunications, all IT-
related consultancy, and all wholesale and retail trade which distributes ICT products. 
(It can be noted that in Norway, this redefinition has the effect of including the entire 
activities of Elkjøp in the ICT sector). 
                                                 
38 OECD, Measuring the ICT Sector (OECD: Paris) 2000 
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On the basis of this redefinition, it has been claimed that ICT is in fact much larger 
than previously believed. These statistical issues are clearly very important. On the 
one hand, ICT in a primary activity across a number of sectors. On the other hand, 
this is also true of many other industries (such as oil), and we need to consider why it 
is that only ICT should be redefined: what are the arguments and rationales for 
classifying ICT in a completely different way from all other activities? We need only 
consider the impacts of treating the broad food-related set of activities as a connected 
whole. This would presumably include all agricultural input activities (machinery, 
fertilisers etc); all agriculture; all food marketing, distribution and trade;  all food 
processing; all retail distribution of food products; and all of the food related service 
sector (including all hotels, restaurants, cafes etc). seeing that food processing alone 
is the biggest manufacturing sector in most OECD economies, and that hotels and 
restaurants is among the biggest activities in the service sector, it is certainly rue that 
food would end up many orders of magnitude larger than ICT. So we cannot conlude 
from recent statistical efforts that ICT is a substantial and growing sector. 
 
These statistical issues are complex in other ways, that severely inhibit our ability to 
make inter-country comparisons and thereby to assess growth impacts. Let us 
consider one such problem, namely the difficulties involved in compiling and 
comparing constant price output and productivity data. The basic raw material for 
international benchmarking is usually the statistical series produced by such 
organizations as OECD, Eurostat and UNESCO. These are often used in an uncritical 
way, as if the data itself is unproblematic. However this is not normally the case – 
there can be big variations in the quality and usability of data series across countries, 
and it is often necessary to be sensitive to this in benchmarking exercises.  Three 
problems in particular can be mentioned.  The first is coverage – data series often 
have gaps, errors, missing values and so on. Widely used datasets such as the OECDs 
STAN and ANBERD databases are explicitly attempts to overcome these problems 
for industrial and R&D data. The second problem is collection methodologies – 
statistical offices across countries often vary in how they view the relevant 
population, and in the sampling methodologies they undertake. For many series, 
especially rather new ‘blue sky’ exercises such as innovation surveys, the sampling 
frames and response rates vary so greatly as to make inter-country comparisons 
(though not intra-country analyses) very difficult. This also applies to the Community 
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Innovation Survey at the present time. Finally, there are differences in methods for 
converting current prices series onto constant price series. 
 
This last issues – converting current to constant prices – may seem somewhat arcane, 
but it can be of major significance for benchmarking exercises. In the ICT sector, for 
example, the USA and Europe use quite different methods for computing the 
constant price values of computing equipment. The USA uses the so-called Hedonic 
price index method, which takes full account of quality improvements as well as 
price falls. European statistical agencies tend to use the so-called Matched-Model 
method, which gives an accurate account of price changes, but neglects the impact of 
quality improvements. 
 
Andrew Wyckoff of the OECD looked at the implications of this, and explored what 
happened if the US methods were applied to European data, and vice versa.39 The 
results were startling -  it turned out that the much-analysed productivity growth 
differences between the USA and Europe in computing equipment were largely due 
to the price indexes used, and did not appear to reflect real productivity or growth 
differences.  
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39 A. Wyckoff, “The impact of computer prices on international comparisons of labour productivity”, 
Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 1995, Vol 3, pp.277-293 
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Figure 11 shows these results of this. It simply rebases the ICT productivity growth 
data for a number of countries, using the methodology of the  US price index. The 
results are that the productivity growth differences largely disappear: 
 
Wyckoff concluded that European productivity in the computer sector has been 
underestimated relative to US and Japan because of statistical differences in price 
deflators. This implies that the precision of international productivity comparisons is 
“severely limited” and that “Researchers should be aware that these [statistical] 
differences … can be a distorting factor in their modes of trade performance, 
investment behaviour and productivity”. 
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&KDSWHU 4XHVWLRQVRIFDXVDOLW\
It is very common to hear, both in professional and popular discussion, such claims as 
’ICT is driving economic growth’. These claims in effect assign a primary causal role 
to ICT - it is seen as something that initiates change, and causes society and economy 
to adapt. Here we examine two basic problems associated with such approaches. The 
first concerns the determinants of ICT development itself: the factors which shape the 
dynamics of ICT evolution. The second concerns the complexity of ICT - the fact that 
it is not one technology but many, and therefore the problems involved in assigning 
causality in the presence of complex inputs.  
 
Many of the claims about ICT ’driving’ growth involve technological determinist 
approaches to society - the idea that technology develops autonomously and shapes 
social change. Although this kind of idea is widespread, it is questionable. 
Technologies come into existence mainly for social reasons - because people make 
decisions to search for new technical solutions, and to develop them. It is society that 
shapes technology, not the other way around. This has major implications for the 
understanding of ICT: the questions concern what it is that shapes technological 
search over time, and why it is that such intensive research and investment efforts are 
made in the area of information processing. In part, this obviously follows from the 
existence of technological opportunity – we happen to have discovered a way of 
storing information, and it is not strange that the implications and possibilities of this 
should be actively explored. But this does not tell us much about why the ICT effort 
has been so extensive. One reason, advanced by James Beniger, is that the increasing 
complexity of the social and technical divisions of labour places extreme demands on 
coordination, both technical and social, and that this is primarily a problem of 
information gathering and analysis: 
 ... national economies constitute open processing systems engaged in  the continuous 
extraction, reorganisation and distribution of environmental inputs to final 
consumption. Until the last century these functions, even in the largest and most 
developed national economies, still were carried on at a human pace ... so long as the 
energy used to process and move material throughputs did not much exceed that of 
human labour, individual workers in the system could provide the information 
processing required for its control. 
Once energy consumption, processing and transportation speeds, and the information 
requirements for control are seen to be inter-related, the Industrial Revolution takes 
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on new meaning. By far its greatest impact from this perspective was to speed up 
society’s entire material processing system, thereby precipitating a crisis of control, a 
period in which innovations in information processing and communications 
technologies lagged behind those of energy and its application to manufacturing and 
transportation.40 
Exploring the development of ICT from this angle involves exploring the broad 
trends in economic evolution - such as globalization and general economic 
interdependence - which create incentives and opportunities for ICT developments 
and applications. Rather than seeing ICT, therefore, as an autonomous driver of 
change, we will seek to outline those economic trends which impel the evolution of 
ICT. 
 
A related methodological issue concerns the link between technological complexity 
and interdependence, on the one hand, and economic effects on the other. We have 
noted several times that ICT is not one technology but many. At the same time, ICT 
is put to work in the context of major organizational changes, and often in the context 
of the application of other (unrelated) technologies. These facts are often neglected, 
with the effect that claims are made for the economic impacts of ICT which are not 
justified: the problem is to establish and use a framework which will allow interaction 
and multiple causality between technologies, organizational forms, and economic 
processes. 
                                                 
40 J. Beniger, The Control Revolution. Technological and Economic Origins of the Information 
Society (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), p.427. 
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$QDQDO\VLVEDVHGRQUHJLVWHUGDWD
Svein Olav Nås et al. R-06-1998 
,QWHUQDVMRQDOW HUIDULQJVJUXQQODJ IRU WHNQRORJL RJ
LQQRYDVMRQVSROLWLNNUHOHYDQWHLPSOLNDVMRQHUIRU1RUJH
Svend-Otto Remøe og Thor Egil 
Braadland 
R-07-1998 
,QQRYDVMRQL1RUJH(QVWDWXVUDSSRUW Svein Olav Nås R-08-1998 
,QQRYDWLRQUHJLPHVDQGWUDMHFWRULHVLQJRRGVWUDQVSRUW Finn Ørstavik R-09-1998 
6WUXNWXURJG\QDPLNNLNXQQVNDSVEDVHUWHQ ULQJHUL2VOR H. Wiig Aslesen, T. Grytli, A. Isaksen, B. 
Jordfald, O. Langeland og O. R. Spilling  
R-10-1998 
*UXQQIRUVNQLQJ RJ ¡NRQRPLVN YHNVW ,NNHLQVWUXPHQWHOO
NXQQVNDS
Johan Hauknes R-11-1998 
’\QDPLF LQQRYDWLRQ V\VWHPV ’R VHUYLFHV KDYH D UROH WR
SOD\"
Johan Hauknes R-12-1998 
6HUYLFHVLQ,QQRYDWLRQ–,QQRYDWLRQLQ6HUYLFHV Johan Hauknes R-13-1998 
,QIRUPDWLRQ DQG FRPPXQLFDWLRQ WHFKQRORJ\ LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO
SROLF\GLVFXVVLRQV
Eric Iversen, Keith Smith and Finn 
Ørstavik  
R-14-1998 
Norwegian Input-Output Clusters and Innovation Patterns Johan Hauknes  R-15-1998 


 
,QQRYDWLRQILUPSURILWDELOLW\DQGJURZWK Svein Olav Nås and Ari Leppãlahti  01/97 
,QQRYDWLRQSROLFLHVIRU60(VLQ1RUZD\$QDO\WLFDOIUDPHZRU
DQGSROLF\RSWLRQV
Arne Isaksen and Keith Smith  02/97 
5HJLRQDO LQQRYDVMRQ (Q Q\ VWUDWHJL L WLOWDNVDUEHLG RJ
UHJLRQDOSROLWLNN
Arne Isaksen  03/97 
,QQRYDWLRQ $FWLYLWLHV LQ 3XOS 3DSHU DQG 3DSHU 3URGXFWV L
(XURSH
Errko Autio, Espen Dietrichs, Karl Führe
and Keith Smith  
04/97 
,QQRYDWLRQ([SHQGLWXUHVLQ(XURSHDQ,QGXVWU\ Rinaldo Evangelista, Tore Sandven, Georgio
Sirilli and Keith Smith  
05/97 
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1\VNDSQLQJRJ WHNQRORJLXWYLNOLQJ L1RUG1RUJH(YDOXHULQJD
17SURJUDPPHW
Arne Isaksen m. fl.  01/96 
1\VNDSQLQJRJ WHNQRORJLXWYLNOLQJ L1RUG1RUJH(YDOXHULQJD
17SURJUDPPHW
Arne Isaksen m. fl.  01/96 - kort 
+RZ LQQRYDWLYH LV 1RUZHJLDQ LQGXVWU\" $Q LQWHUQDWLRQD
FRPSDULVRQ
Svein Olav Nås  02/96  
/RFDWLRQDQGLQQRYDWLRQ*HRJUDSKLFDOYDULDWLRQVLQLQQRYDWLY
DFWLYLW\LQ1RUZHJLDQPDQXIDFWXULQJLQGXVWU\
Arne Isaksen  03/96  
7\SRORJLHVRILQQRYDWLRQLQVPDOODQGPHGLXPVL]HGHQWHUSULVH
LQ1RUZD\
Tore Sandven 04/96 
,QQRYDWLRQRXWSXWVLQWKH1RUZHJLDQHFRQRP\+RZLQQRYDWLY
DUHVPDOOILUPVDQGPHGLXPVL]HGHQWHUSULVHVLQ1RUZD\
Tore Sandven 05/96  
6HUYLFHVLQ(XURSHDQ,QQRYDWLRQ6\VWHPV$UHYLHZRILVVXHV Johan Hauknes and Ian Miles  06/96 
,QQRYDWLRQLQWKH6HUYLFH(FRQRP\ Johan Hauknes 07/96  
(QGULQJLWHOHNRPPXQLNDVMRQXWIRUGULQJHUIRU1RUJH Terje Nord og Trond Einar Pedersen  08/96 
$QHPSLULFDOVWXG\RIWKHLQQRYDWLRQV\VWHPLQ)LQPDUN Heidi Wiig  09/96  
7HFKQRORJ\DFTXLVLWLRQE\60(
VLQ1RUZD\ Tore Sandven 10/96 
,QQRYDWLRQ3ROLFLHVIRU60(VLQ1RUZD\ Mette Christiansen, Kim Møller Jørgensen
and Keith Smith  
11/96 
’HVLJQDQG,QQRYDWLRQLQ1RUZHJLDQ,QGXVWU\ Eva Næss Karlsen, Keith Smith and Nil
Henrik Solum  
12/96 
/RFDWLRQ DJJORPHUDWLRQ DQG LQQRYDWLRQ 7RZDUGV UHJLRQD
LQQRYDWLRQV\VWHPVLQ1RUZD\"
Bjørn T. Asheim and Arne Isaksen  13/96 
6XVWDLQHG(FRQRPLF’HYHORSPHQW William Lazonick and Mary O'Sullivan  14/96 
3RVWHQV VWLOOLQJ L GHW JOREDOH LQIRUPDVMRQVDPIXQQHW H
HNVSORUDWLYWVWXGLXP
Eric Iversen og Trond Einar Pedersen  15/96 
5HJLRQDO&OXVWHUVDQG&RPSHWLWLYHQHVVWKH1RUZHJLDQ&DVH Arne Isaksen  16/96 

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:KDW FRPSULVHV D UHJLRQDO LQQRYDWLRQ V\VWHP" $Q HPSLULFD
VWXG\
Heidi Wiig and Michelle Wood  01/95  
$GRSWLQJD 
KLJKWHFK
SROLF\ LQD 
ORZWHFK
 LQGXVWU\7KHFDV
RIDTXDFXOWXUH
Espen Dietrichs  02/95  
,QGXVWULDO ’LVWULFWV DV 
OHDUQLQJ UHJLRQV
 $ FRQGLWLRQ IR
SURVSHULW\
Bjørn Asheim  03/95  

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1HZ GLUHFWLRQV LQ UHVHDUFK DQG WHFKQRORJ\ SROLF\ ,GHQWLI\LQJ
WKHNH\LVVXHV
Keith Smith  01/94  
)R8LQRUVNQ ULQJVOLY Svein Olav Nås og Vemund Riiser  02/94  
&RPSHWLWLYHQHVV DQG LWV SUHGHFHVVRUV  D \HDU FURVV
QDWLRQDOSHUVSHFWLYH
Erik S. Reinert  03/94  
,QQRYDVMRQRJQ\WHNQRORJLLQRUVNLQGXVWUL(QRYHUVLNW Svein Olav Nås, Tore Sandven og Keith
Smith  
04/94  
0RWHQUHJLRQDOLQQRYDVMRQVSROLWLNNIRU1RUJH Arne Isaksen  04/95  
)RUVNHUPRELOLWHWLQ ULQJVOLYHWL Anders Ekeland  05/94 
1DWXUYLWHUQHVNRQWDNWPHGDQGUHVHNWRUHULVDPIXQQHW Heidi Wiig og Anders Ekeland  06/94  
)RUVNQLQJVRJWHNQRORJLVDPDUEHLGLQRUVNLQGXVWUL Svein Olav Nås  07/94  
)RUVNHUPRELOLWHWLLQVWLWXWWVHNWRUHQL Heidi Wiig og Anders Ekeland  08/94  
0RGHOOLQJWKHPRELOLW\RIUHVHDUFKHUV Johan Hauknes 09/94  
,QWHUDFWLRQV LQ NQRZOHGJH V\VWHPV )RXQGDWLRQV SROLF\
LPSOLFDWLRQVDQGHPSLULFDOPHWKRGV
Keith Smith  10/94 
7MHQHVWHVHNWRUHQLGHW¡NRQRPLVNHKHOKHWVELOGHW Erik S. Reinert  11/94 
5HFHQWWUHQGVLQHFRQRPLFWKHRU\LPSOLFDWLRQVIRUGHYHORSPHQ
JHRJUDSK\
Erik S. Reinert and Vemund Riiser  12/94  
7MHQHVWH\WHQGHQ ULQJHU¡NRQRPLRJWHNQRORJL Johan Hauknes 13/94  
7HNQRORJLSROLWLNNLGHWQRUVNHVWDWVEXGVMHWWHW Johan Hauknes 14/94  
$6FKXPSHWHULDQWKHRU\RIXQGHUGHYHORSPHQWDFRQWUDGLFWLR
LQWHUPV"
Erik S. Reinert  15/94  
8QGHUVWDQGLQJ 5	’ SHUIRUPDQFH $ QRWH RQ D QHZ 2(&’
LQGLFDWRU
Tore Sandven 16/94  
1RUVN ILVNHULWHNQRORJL  SROLWLVNH PnO L P¡WH PHG UHJLRQDO
NXOWXUHU
Olav Wicken  17/94  
5HJLRQDOH LQQRYDVMRQVV\VWHP 7HNQRORJLSROLWLNN VRP
UHJLRQDOSROLWLNN
Bjørn Asheim  18/94  
+YRUIRUHU¡NRQRPLVNYHNVWJHRJUDILVNXMHYQWIRUGHOW" Erik S. Reinert  19/94  
&UHDWLQJDQGH[WUDFWLQJYDOXH&RUSRUDWHLQYHVWPHQWEHKDYLRX
DQGHFRQRPLFSHUIRUPDQFH
William Lazonick  20/94  
(QWUHSUHQ¡UVNDSL0¡UHRJ5RPVGDO(WKLVWRULVNSHUVSHNWLY Olav Wicken  21/94 
Fiskerinæringens teknologi og dens regionale forankring Espen Dietrichs og Keith Smith  22/94  
6NLOOIRUPDWLRQLQZHDOWK\QDWLRQV2UJDQL]DWLRQDOHYROXWLRQDQ
HFRQRPLFFRQVHTXHQFHV
William Lazonick and Mary O'Sullivan  23/94 
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(OHPHQWHU L HQ IHOOHV LQQRYDVMRQVSROLWLNN IRU
7U¡QGHODJVI\ONHQH
Thor Egil Braadland A-01-2001 

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(YDOXHULQJ DY RIIHQWOLJH RJ LQGXVWULHOOH IRUVNQLQJV RJ
XWYLNOLQJVNRQWUDNWHU7DOOJUXQQODJ
Markus Bugge A-01-2000 
5DLVLQJ VWDQGDUGV ,QQRYDWLRQ DQG WKH HPHUJLQJ JOREDO
VWDQGDUGL]DWLRQHQYLURQPHQWIRU,&7
Eric J. Iversen A-02-2000 
1\VNDSLQJVSURVMHNWHULVPnRJXQJHEHGULIWHU+YLONHQUROOH
VSLOOHU2VORRPUnGHW"
Arne Isaksen A-03-2000 

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NRQRPLVN DQDO\VH DY WMHQHVWHQ ULQJHU 8WIRUGULQJHU WLO
GDWDJUXQQODJHW
Johan Hauknes A-01-1999 
5XVKLQJ WR 5(*,11 7KH HYROXWLRQ RI D VHPLLQVWLWXWLRQDO
DSSURDFK
Svend Otto Remøe A-02-1999 
7()7 ’LIIXVLQJ WHFKQRORJ\ IURP UHVHDUFK LQVWLWXWHV WR
60(V
Svend Otto Remøe A-03-1999 
7KHKLVWRULFDOHYROXWLRQRILQQRYDWLRQDQGWHFKQRORJ\SROLF\
LQ1RUZD\
Finn Ørstavik A-04-1999
’HQGLJLWDOH¡NRQRPL)DJOLJHRJSROLWLVNHXWIRUGULQJHU Svein Olav Nås og Johan Hauknes A-05-1999 
1RUVNH,7NRPSHWDQVHPLOM¡HU Thor Egil Braadland, Anders Ekeland og 
Andreas Wulff 
A-06-1999 
$SDWHQWVKDUHDQGFLWDWLRQDQDO\VLVRINQRZOHGJHEDVHVDQG
LQWHUDFWLRQVLQWKH1RUZHJLDQLQQRYDWLRQV\VWHP
Eric J. Iversen A-07-1999 
.QRZOHGJH LQIUDVWUXFWXUH LQ WKH1RUZHJLDQSXOSDQGSDSHU
LQGXVWU\
Thor Egil Braadland A-08-1999 
6WDWHQRJ,7NRPSHWDQVHQ2IIHUHOOHUDNWLYLVW" Anders Ekeland og Thor Egil Braadland A-09-1999 
,QQRYDWLRQV\VWHPVDQGFDSDELOLWLHV Johan Hauknes A-10-1999 
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,QVWLWXWLRQDO PDSSLQJ RI WKH 1RUZHJLDQ QDWLRQDO V\VWHP RI
LQQRYDWLRQ
Finn Ørstavik and Svein Olav Nås A-01-1998 
,QQRYDVMRQVVWUDWHJLHU IRU $XVW$JGHU ,QQVSLOO WLO 6WUDWHJLVN
1 ULQJVSODQ
Arne Isaksen og Nils Henrik Solum A-02-1998 
.QRZOHGJH ,QWHQVLYH%XVLQHVV 6HUYLFHV$ 6HFRQG1DWLRQDO
.QRZOHGJH,QIUDVWUXFWXUH"
Erland Skogli A-03-1998 
2IIVKRUHHQJLQHHULQJFRQVXOWLQJDQGLQQRYDWLRQ Erland Skogli A-04-1998 
)RUPHOO NRPSHWDQVH L QRUVN DUEHLGVOLY  1RHQ
IRUHO¡SLJH UHVXOWDWHU IUD DQDO\VHU DY GH QRUVNH
V\VVHOVHWWLQJVILOHQH
Svein Olav Nås, Anders Ekeland og 
Johan Hauknes 
A-05-1998 
0DFKLQHWRROVHUYLFHVDQGLQQRYDWLRQ Trond Einar Pedersen A-06-1998 
*HRJUDSKLF,QIRUPDWLRQ7HFKQRORJ\6HUYLFHVDQGWKHLU5ROH
LQ&XVWRPHU,QQRYDWLRQ
Roar Samuelsen A-07-1998 
)R8DNWLYLWHWL2VOR(QSUHVHQWDVMRQDYQRHQVHQWUDOH)R8
GDWD
Nils Henrik Solum A-08-1998 
,QQRYDWLRQFDSDELOLWLHVLQVRXWKHUQDQGQRUWKHUQ1RUZD\ Thor Egil Braadland A-09-1998 
7KH1RUZHJLDQ,QQRYDWLRQ&ROODERUDWLRQ6XUYH\ Finn Ørstavik and Svein Olav Nås A-10-1998 

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6HUYLFHV LQ WKH OHDUQLQJ HFRQRP\  LPSOLFDWLRQV IRU
WHFKQRORJ\SROLF\
Johan Hauknes, Pim den Hertog and Ian 
Miles 
1/97 
.QRZOHGJHLQWHQVLYHVHUYLFHVZKDWLVWKHLUUROH" Johan Hauknes and Cristiano Antonelli 2/97 
$QGUHZ 9DQ GH 9HQV LQQRYDVMRQVVWXGLHU RJ 0LQQHVRWD
SURJUDPPHW
Hans C. Christensen 3/97 

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$FTXLVLWLRQRIWHFKQRORJ\LQVPDOOILUPV Tore Sandven 1/96 
5	’ LQ 1RUZD\  –  $Q RYHUYLHZ RI WKH JUDQG
VHFWRUV
Johan Hauknes 2/96 
II 
STEP 
Studies in technology, innovation, and economic policy 


  
(QVDPPHQKROGWWHNQRORJLSROLWLNN" Johan Hauknes 1/95 
)RUVNQLQJVSURVMHNWHU L LQGXVWULHOO UHJL L .MHPLVN NRPLWH L
171)LRJnUHQH
Hans C. Christensen 2/95 
%UXNDY(9(17YHGHYDOXHULQJDY6.$3WLOWDN Anders Ekeland 3/95 
7HOHNRPPXQLNDVMRQ 2IIHQWOLJ SROLWLNN RJ VRVLDOH DVSHNWHU
IRUGLVWULEXWLYHIRUKROG
Terje Nord/Trond Einar Pedersen 4/95 
,PPDWULHOOH UHWWLJKHWHU RJ QRUVN Q ULQJVSROLWLNN (W
NRPPHQWHUWUHIHUDWWLO12(VHPLQDUHW
Eric Iversen 5/95 
,QQRYDWLRQ SHUIRUPDQFH DW LQGXVWU\ OHYHO LQ 1RUZD\ 3XOS
DQGSDSHU
STEP-gruppen 6/95 
,QQRYDWLRQ SHUIRUPDQFH DW LQGXVWU\ OHYHO LQ1RUZD\%DVLF
PHWDOV
STEP-gruppen 7/95 
,QQRYDWLRQ SHUIRUPDQFH DW LQGXVWU\ OHYHO LQ 1RUZD\
&KHPLFDOV
STEP-gruppen 8/95 
,QQRYDWLRQSHUIRUPDQFHDWLQGXVWU\OHYHOLQ1RUZD\%R[HV
FRQWDLQHUVHWF
STEP-gruppen 9/95 
,QQRYDWLRQSHUIRUPDQFHDW LQGXVWU\ OHYHO LQ1RUZD\0HWDO
SURGXFWV
STEP-gruppen 10/95 
,QQRYDWLRQ SHUIRUPDQFH DW LQGXVWU\ OHYHO LQ 1RUZD\
0DFKLQHU\
STEP-gruppen 11/95 
,QQRYDWLRQ SHUIRUPDQFH DW LQGXVWU\ OHYHO LQ 1RUZD\
(OHFWULFDODSSDUDWXV
STEP-gruppen 12/95 
,QQRYDWLRQSHUIRUPDQFHDWLQGXVWU\OHYHOLQ1RUZD\,7 STEP-gruppen 13/95 
,QQRYDWLRQSHUIRUPDQFHDWLQGXVWU\OHYHOLQ1RUZD\7H[WLOH STEP-gruppen 14/95 
,QQRYDWLRQSHUIRUPDQFHDW LQGXVWU\ OHYHO LQ1RUZD\)RRG
EHYHUDJHVDQGWREDFFR
STEP-gruppen 15/95 
7KH 1RUZHJLDQ 1DWLRQDO ,QQRYDWLRQ 6\VWHP $ VWXG\ RI
NQRZOHGJHFUHDWLRQGLVWULEXWLRQDQGXVH
Keith Smith, Espen Dietrichs and Svein 
Olav Nås 
16/95 
3RVWHQV VWLOOLQJ L GHW JOREDOH LQIRUPDVMRQVVDPIXQQHW L HW
HNVSORUDWLYWVWXGLXP
Eric Iversen og Trond Einar Pedersen 
med hjelp av Erland Skogli og Keith 
Smith 
17/95 
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0nOIRUPXOHULQJL171)L0DMRUVWLG Hans C. Christensen 1/94 
%DVLVWHNQRORJLHQHVUROOHLLQQRYDVMRQVSURVHVVHQ Hans C. Christensen 2/94 
.RQNXUUDQVHG\NWLJHEHGULIWHURJ¡NRQRPLVNWHRULPRWHQQ\
IRUVWnHOVH
Erik S. Reinert 3/94 
)RUVNQLQJRPWMHQHVWH\WLQJ Johan Hauknes 4/94 
)RUVNQLQJ RP WMHQHVWH\WLQJ 8WIRUGULQJHU IRU
NXQQVNDSVJUXQQODJHW
Johan Hauknes 5/94 
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67(3JUXSSHQ EOH HWDEOHUW L  IRU n IRUV\QH
EHVOXWQLQJVWDNHUH PHG IRUVNQLQJ NQ\WWHW WLO DOOH
VLGHU YHG LQQRYDVMRQ RJ WHNQRORJLVN HQGULQJ PHG
V UOLJ YHNW Sn IRUKROGHW PHOORP LQQRYDVMRQ
¡NRQRPLVN YHNVW RJ GH VDPIXQQVPHVVLJH
RPJLYHOVHU %DVLV IRU JUXSSHQV DUEHLG HU
HUNMHQQHOVHQ DY DW XWYLNOLQJHQ LQQHQ YLWHQVNDS RJ
WHNQRORJLHUIXQGDPHQWDO IRU¡NRQRPLVNYHNVW’HW
JMHQVWnU OLNHYHO PDQJH XO¡VWH SUREOHPHU RPNULQJ
KYRUGDQ SURVHVVHQ PHG YLWHQVNDSHOLJ RJ
WHNQRORJLVN HQGULQJ IRUO¡SHU RJ KYRUGDQ GHQQH
SURVHVVHQ InU VDPIXQQVPHVVLJH RJ ¡NRQRPLVNH
NRQVHNYHQVHU)RUVWnHOVHDYGHQQHSURVHVVHQHUDY
VWRUEHW\GQLQJIRUXWIRUPLQJHQRJLYHUNVHWWHOVHQDY
IRUVNQLQJV WHNQRORJL RJ LQQRYDVMRQVSROLWLNNHQ
)RUVNQLQJHQ L 67(3JUXSSHQ HU GHUIRU VHQWUHUW
RPNULQJ KLVWRULVNH ¡NRQRPLVNH VRVLRORJLVNH RJ
RUJDQLVDWRULVNH VS¡UVPnO VRP HU UHOHYDQWH IRU GH
EUHGH IHOWHQH LQQRYDVMRQVSROLWLNN RJ ¡NRQRPLVN
YHNVW


7KH67(3JURXSZDVHVWDEOLVKHGLQWRVXSSRUW
SROLF\PDNHUV ZLWK UHVHDUFK RQ DOO DVSHFWV RI
LQQRYDWLRQDQGWHFKQRORJLFDOFKDQJHZLWKSDUWLFXODU
HPSKDVLV RQ WKH UHODWLRQVKLSV EHWZHHQ LQQRYDWLRQ
HFRQRPLFJURZWKDQGWKHVRFLDOFRQWH[W7KHEDVLV
RIWKHJURXS•VZRUNLVWKHUHFRJQLWLRQWKDWVFLHQFH
WHFKQRORJ\ DQG LQQRYDWLRQ DUH IXQGDPHQWDO WR
HFRQRPLFJURZWK\HWWKHUHUHPDLQPDQ\XQUHVROYHG
SUREOHPVDERXWKRZWKHSURFHVVHVRIVFLHQWLILFDQG
WHFKQRORJLFDOFKDQJHDFWXDOO\RFFXUDQGDERXWKRZ
WKH\ KDYH VRFLDO DQG HFRQRPLF LPSDFWV 5HVROYLQJ
VXFK SUREOHPV LV FHQWUDO WR WKH IRUPDWLRQ DQG
LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI VFLHQFH WHFKQRORJ\ DQG
LQQRYDWLRQ SROLF\ 7KH UHVHDUFK RI WKH 67(3 JURXS
FHQWUHV RQ KLVWRULFDO HFRQRPLF VRFLDO DQG
RUJDQLVDWLRQDO LVVXHV UHOHYDQW IRU EURDG ILHOGV RI
LQQRYDWLRQSROLF\DQGHFRQRPLFJURZWK 
 
